The sharp increase in depository institution failures in recent years has drawn attention to the moral hazard created by under-priced deposit insurance. To identify possible reforms, researchers have begun to consider alternative deposit insurance arrangements. This paper contributes to that literature by examining the deposit insurance system of Kansas, which operated from 1909 to 1929. The Kansas system had a number of regulations that were intended to limit risk-taking, and membership was made voluntary to assuage objections that insurance forces conservative banks to protect depositors of high-risk institutions. Using individual bank data, we test explicitly whether adverse selection and moral hazard characterized the Kansas system. We find that risk-prone banks were the most likely to join the system at its inception. And, using a simultaneous equation model, we find that both adverse selection and moral hazard behavior were present throughout the system's first ten years.
I. Introduction
Many economists have identified federal deposit insurance as an important contributor to the large number of bank and savings and loan failures in recent years. 1 To the extent of insurance coverage, depositors have little or no incentive to demand risk premia on deposit interest rates, and therefore a bank's cost of funds does not increase proportionally with its insolvency risk. Deposit insurance subsidizes risk-taking, therefore, creating a "moral hazard" in that banks with insured deposits will find it optimal to assume more risk than they would otherwise. 2 In recent years increased competition and liability deregulation have both encouraged and enabled depository institutions to increase risk-taking, and the number of failures has risen dramatically.
Federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933 in response to the bank failures of the Great Depression. Deposit insurance was not, however, a new policy. During the 19th and early 20th centuries a number of states had experimented with their own insurance plans, and in the l930s deposit insurance opponents pointed to the unsatisfactory performance of many of these plans as evidence that federal insurance 1 See Kane (1985 Kane ( , 1989 , Kaufman (1989, pp. 208-09) , and O'Driscoll l988), for example. If regulators can accurately monitor bank risk and charge riskadjusted premiums, there would be no incentive for banks to assume more risk than they would in the absence of insurance.
Several studies have proposed risk-adjusted premiums, e.g., General Accounting Office (1991), date, however, premiums remain unrelated to failure risk. Although federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933, risk-taking was contained and failures were not a problem as long as regulations limited competition and protected charter values, and interest rates remained relatively low and stable [Keeley (1990) ].
could not work.
The American Bankers Association (1933, 43) , for example, argued:
As a matter of unbiased history ... the guaranty of deposits plan proved fallacious and unworkable.... It has proved to be one of those plausible, but deceptive, human plans that, in actual application only serve to render worse the very evils they seek to cure.
More detached study of the state plans finds that some worked better than others. Calomiris (1989) concludes that the 19th century Indiana insurance system, for example, minimized moral hazard problems by introducing a form of coinsurance that gave banks the incentive and ability to monitor each other and enforce conservative behavior. The plans of other states, like the infamous New York Safety Fund, suffered extensively from moral hazard and from adverse selection, i.e., that risk-prone banks chose to join the insurance system while conservative banks stayed out, leaving depositors without credible insurance. 4
A number of proposals have been offered to reform the present deposit insurance system, from increased regulation of bank activities to privatization of deposit insurance. 5 Calomiris (1989) has shown that the 19th and early 20th century state deposit insurance systems can provide considerable insight into the current crisis and suggest how deposit insurance might be reformed to minimize problems in the future.
This paper presents new evidence on the incentive effects of deposit insurance by studying the insurance system of Kansas, which operated from 1909 to 1929. The Kansas system had a number of unique features that were intended to limit risk-taking, including voluntary membership.
This aspect makes it possible to compare the behavior of insured and Cooke (1909) , Robb (1921 ), Federal Deposit Insurance System (1956 and Golembe (1960) Total capital is the sum of the par value of the bank's stock, the paid-in surplus, and undivided profits.
To limit risk-taking by insured banks, the state imposed interest rate ceilings on insured deposits and set insurance premiums that were inversely related to a bank's capital to deposit ratio. It is unclear, however, whether the effect of deposit insurance was to cause banks to be more risk-taking '~r merely tos ort risk-prone from conservative banks.
In this paper we attempt to discern whether the greater risk-taking by insured banks was due to moral hazard, adverse selection, or both.
III. Adverse Selection in the Kansas System
If deposit insurance premiums are not tied to failure risk, then risk-prone banks will gain the most from the inherent insurance subsidy;
hence they should be more likely to join a voluntary insurance system than conservative banks. We test for self-selection in the Kansas system by attempting to predict the insurance status of a random sample of eligible banks in 1910 using balance sheet information about them in 1908, the year prior to the introduction of deposit insurance. 16 We employ a probit regression framework, in which the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bank was insured in 1910 and 0 if not.
If risk-prone banks were more willing to pay the costs of membership in the insurance system, we expect that less well capitalized insured banks .163. The difference is statistically significant at thẽ 0l level.
The closer a bank was to failure, the better insurance status is at distinguishing failing from non-failing banks.
The behavior of insured Kansas banks thus appears to have been like that of the "zombie" S&Ls of the 1980s that were insolvent, but permitted by regulators to remain open [Kane (1989) ]. This behavior is consistent with the model of Furlong and Keeley (1989) , in which risk-taking is higher the lower is the capital/asset ratio. 16
Our sample consists of approximately one-fourth of the Kansas banks that were eligible for insurance in 1910.
The data comes from biennial reports of the Kansas Commissioner of Banking.
Complete source information is in the appendix. banks were more likely to join the insurance system than others. We employ two alternative financial ratios, total capital to assets (capital/assets) and surplus and undivided profits to loans and discounts (surplus/loans), to test this hypothesis. 17
We expect the coefficients on each to be negative, i.e., that banks with lower capital ratios had a greater likelihood of joining the insurance system.
Loans are generally the most risky assets that banks hold; moreover, the loan portfolios of the small unit banks of Kansas were likely not well diversified. Wheelock (1992) finds that the higher was a bank's loan to asset ratio, the more likely it was to fail within two years of the balance sheet date. Thus the coefficient on this variable
(loans/assets) should be positive in our insurance status regressions, since banks with relatively high ratios appear to have been riskier than others, and so might have had a greater demand for insurance.
Conservative banks are likely to hold relatively large reserves with which to meet deposit withdrawals. Although cash and other reserve items have low (or no) explicit yields, a high reserve to deposit ratio better enables a bank to accommodate unexpected deposit outflows without resorting to high-priced borrowing. Thus, we expect that banks with relatively high reserve to deposit ratios (cash/deposits) would in general be less risk-taking, and so the coefficient on this variable should be negative.
We also include the deposits to assets (deposits/assets) ratio as an independent variable, Presumably insurance lowered the cost of deposits, and hence the more a bank relied on deposits as a source of 17 White (1984) and Wheelock (1992) both find the surplus/loan ratio to be important for distinguishing failing from non-failing banks.
funds the greater its demand for insurance. Thus a positive coefficient on this variable might be expected. It is likely, however, that the banks relying most heavily on deposits in 1908 were conservative banks that could attract deposits at a relatively low price because of their safety.
In the days before insurance, banks routinely advertised their strength and conservatism. Risky banks with weak balance sheets probably had to pay higher interest rates to attract deposits, and therefore might have relied less heavily on them as a source of funds.
This suggests that the coefficient on the ratio of deposits to assets should in fact be negative.
In a study of national banks failing during the banking panic of 1930, White (1984) found that the higher a bank's ratio of U.S.
Government bonds to assets, the lower was its failure probability. If large bond holdings reflected relatively conservative behavior, then in the insurance status regressions it seems reasonable to expect a negative coefficient on the bond to asset ratio (bonds/assets). There is no information, however, about the quality or type of bonds that Kansas banks held in 1908, and it is unlikely that U.S. Government bonds comprised a significant portion of their portfolios before World War I.
In the absence of such information, it is impossible to predict the sign of this variable's coefficient with confidence.
Finally, we include the ratio of bills payable and other liabilities to assets (bills pay./assets) as a regressor. The principal source of funds for a bank are deposits. But a bank might rely on alternative sources of funds if it is unable to attract sufficient deposits to finance expansion or to remain liquid in the event of deposit withdrawals or loan defaults. Wheelock (1992) and White (1984) find that heavy reliance on non-deposit sources for funds is a useful predictor of bank failure, suggesting that risk-prone banks were more likely to have high ratios. It is reasonable therefore to expect a positive coefficient on this variable in the insurance status model.
Relatively few banks had significant bills payable or other liabilities in 1908, however, so we are unsure how important this variable is likely to be here. 18
We include two additional variables to help explain insurance status: bank size, as measured by the log of total assets (ln Assets), and the number of years since the bank received its charter (Age). On average, insured banks tended to be larger than non-insured banks, and we are interested in whether size remains important after controlling for other bank characteristics.
We include age to capture intangibles, such as goodwill or management quality, that might have affected a bank's decision to join the insurance system, For example, depositors might have felt more secure putting their money in a bank that had been in business for many years. Older banks might have had less demand for insurance because they already enjoyed a comparatively low cost of deposits. If true, then the coefficient on age should be negative: the longer a bank had been in business, the less likely it was to join the insurance system.
Model estimates are reported in Table 1 . We find that the lower a bank's capital to asset ratio in 1908, the more likely it was to belong to the insurance system in 1910. This strongly suggests adverse selection: risk-prone banks were more likely to join than were
18
Of 182 banks in the sample, 55 had outstanding bills payable or other liabilities, but in many cases the amounts were quite small.
conservative banks. The coefficient on an alternative measure of capital adequacy, the surplus to loan ratio, is not statistically significant. Equation 1.1 also indicates that the higher a bank's loan to asset ratio or bond to assets ratio, the more likely it was to join the insurance system. The sign and significance of the coefficient on the bond to asset ratio is consistent across specifications, but that on the loan to asset ratio is not.
We find that the higher a bank's deposit to asset ratio in 1908, the less likely it was to join the insurance system, suggesting that banks relying relatively heavily on deposits before the founding of the system did so because they were conservative and could attract deposits at comparatively low cost.
The ratio of cash and other reserves to deposits does not appear of any value in predicting insurance status, however, nor does the ratio of bills payable and other liabilities to assets.
Equation 1.3 omits the bond to assets and bills payable to assets ratios. 19 The only substantive difference with this specification is the statistical significance of bank size: larger banks appear to have been somewhat more likely to join the insurance system. We also find that the more years a bank had been in business, the less likely it was to join the insurance system. Apparently, established banks gained less from joining the insurance system in terms of lower deposit costs than did newer banks.
19
We report this specification since we are unable to predict the coefficient sign of the bonds/assets ratio, and because few banks had large amounts of bills payable outstanding in 1908. Balance sheet comparison of insured and non-insured banks indicates that insured banks were less well capitalized. Table 2 reports comparisons of the mean capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios for insured and non-insured banks in each year of our sample. The mean ratios of insured banks were lower than those of non-insured banks in each year.
22
We have disaggregated these data further to compare the mean ratios of newly insured banks and insured banks that had also been 20 Our data are for a random sample of one-fourth the eligible state banks in 1914. We collected data for each of these banks from the Kansas Commissioner of Banking reports for 1910, 1914, 1918, and 1920 , which are the only years for which balance sheets were published. All of the banks in the sample operated in each year, but we eliminated 28 banks from the sample in 1910 because they did not meet the various requirements for membership in the insurance system.
Since all of the banks remaining in the sample were in business before the insurance system began, it excludes any banks opened for the purpose of exploiting the insurance system, which means our results should understate thẽ xtent of adverse selection and moral hazard in the Kansas system. 1 We use the term "moral hazard" to mean any risk-taking induced by deposit insurance, whether observable by the insurer or not, and our measures of risk, the capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios, obviously w~reobservable on the reporting dates. 2
For both ratios the differences between insured and non-insured banks are statistically significant (at the .05 level or higher) in 1910 and 1920 . For 1914 and 1918 , the difference in the capital/asset ratio is significant. members in the previous reporting year. 23 In each year newly insured banks had higher capital ratios than other insured banks, but both had lower mean capital ratios than non-insured banks. Banks joining the insurance system thus appear to have been riskier than those staying out.
That banks belonging to the system in the previous year had the lowest ratios could reflect risk-taking induced by membership, or simply that the highest risk banks were the first to join the system.
Further evidence of how insurance system membership affected bank behavior is presented in Wnable to determine whether they withdrew voluntarily. The differences in the capital/asset change and the surplus/loan change between non-insured and newly insured banks are significant at the .10 and .01 levels, respectively.
The differences between newly insured and other insured banks are not significant. (1)
where Y 1 measures the riskiness of a bank and Y 2 " measures its (unobserved) desire to belong to the deposit insurance system. We observe Y 2 , which is a dichotomous variable defined as:
In other words, a bank joins the insurance system only when its desire to do so exceeds a certain threshold (which we normalize to zero). If adverse selection is present then~2 will be positive. Similarly, if insurance system membership encourages risk-taking, then~will be positive. The X variables in (1) and (2) represent various regressors believed to affect bank riskiness and the desire to carry deposit insurance. They are discussed below.
The parameters of Equation (2) cannot be estimated consistently with maximum likelihood probit because Y 1 is endogenous and correlated with u2. Similarly, the OLS estimates of (1) (replacing y 2 * with Y 2 ) may be inconsistent because Y 2 and u 1 may not be independent.
Consistent estimates can, however, be obtained from the reduced form of (1) and (2), viz.,
Our interest is in the structural parameters (a 1 , a 2 , /~l, and fl2), which can be recovered uniquely from it 1 and it 2 only if (1) and (2) 
The structural equations (1) and (2) are now written as: We measure risk (Y 1 ) with the capital/asset ratio, and expect (a2/a 2 ) to be negative if adverse selection is present. Y 2 is a binary variable reflecting the insurance status of a bank, 1 if insured and 0 if not. The control variables, X 1 and X 2 , are those we believe might 25 Note that the estimated parameters are (a 1 a 2 ), (a 2 /a 2 ), /~l~and (~2/a 2 );~cannot be identified.
have affected a bank's risk-taking or its decision to join the deposit insurance system.
The results in Table 1 indicate that membership in the deposit insurance system was related negatively to age. We therefore include this variable (Age) in X 2 . 26 It seems likely that competition influenced a bank's decision to join the insurance system, and this could explain why newer banks were more likely to join. Established banks might have been able to attract deposits at relatively low cost, and therefore had less demand for insurance.
We include two additional variables that capture other aspects of competition and thus which might have affected a bank's membership decision.
For each bank we include the ratio of insured to total banks in the bank's county (Dlratio). In order to compete successfully for deposits, a bank might have been more likely to join the insurance system if most of its competitors were also members, regardless of its own preferences for risk. Banks in counties with few members might have felt less competitive pressure to join themselves.
We also include the ratio of total banks to county population (Bankpop) as a regressor. Because branching was not permitted, rural counties with low population density typically had the highest numbers of banks per person. It has often been argued that rural banking markets were disrupted by a. dramatic decline in transportation costs between 1910 and 1920, as rural roads were improved and many farmers 26 Although insurance system membership was also related to bank size and various financial ratios we do not include these variables in X 2 since they are notexogenous, but jointly determined with insurance status. To explain a bank's risk-taking we again include bank age and competition, as measured by the number of banks divided by population.
We also include measures of local economic conditions that might have caused bank capital/asset ratios to vary systematically across counties.
Aside from competitive changes induced by transportation improvements, banks located in rural counties might have behaved differently than those in cities, and so we include the percent rural of county population (Rural is negative and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis that membership in the insurance system led banks to hold lower capital/asset ratios than non-participating banks.
There is some evidence also that banks in rural counties and those located in counties with relatively large increases in land value had higher ratios. 31
Equation 4.2 indicates that adverse selection also characterized the deposit insurance system between 1910 and 1920. The coefficient on C/A (the capital/asset ratio "predicted" in the first-stage) is negative and statistically significant, showing that risk-prone banks had a higher demand for deposit insurance than did conservative banks. The positive and significant coefficient on the ratio of insured to total banks (Dlratio) indicates also that a bank was more likely to belong to the system if its closest competitors were also members. 32 30 A full description of our data and sources is presented in thẽ pendix. Each regression was estimated with four regional dummies and four dummies marking the years from which the balance sheet data are drawn. None of the regional dummies has a significant coefficient; those on the dummies for 1910 and 1914 are positive and statistically significant, while that for 1918 is negative and marginally significant. The dummỹ or 1920 was omitted. 2 Since Dlratio is the ratio of insured to total banks in a county, in counties with few banks (three counties had but 1 bank) the membership decision of a single bank has a large influence on this variable. Thus by including this variable as a regressor, we bias the other regressor coefficients toward zero and against finding adverse selection.
V. Conclusion
The Kansas deposit insurance system suffered from both adverse selection and moral hazard. Using balance sheet information from 1908, the year before the introduction of deposit insurance, we are able to distinguish banks that joined the system in its first year of operation from those which did not. The lower a bank's capital/asset or deposit/asset ratio in 1908, the more likely it was to be a member of the system two years later. Risk-prone banks thus appear to have had a greater demand for deposit insurance and were the first to join the system.
Adverse selection continued to characterize the deposit insurance system throughout its first decade. We estimate a simultaneous equation model in order to disentangle adverse selection from risk-taking induced by insurance system membership, and conclude that both effects were present: risk-prone banks had a greater demand for deposit insurance and were more likely to join the system, while insurance system membership appears to have led banks to become riskier. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively (one-tail tests). .0018 -.0083 C/Al4-C/Al0 and S/Ll4-S/L1O are the differences in the mean capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios between 1910 and 1914 for the category of banks indicated.
C/A18-C/l4 and S/Ll8-S/L14, and C/A20-C/l8 and S/L2O-S/Ll8 are defined similarly. Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tail tests).
a the coefficients in this regression have been multiplied by 100.
Each regression also included regional dummies and dummies for each balance sheet year.
Variable definitions and data sources: see text and appendix.
